Forensic Monitor exists because its founder, Thomas Kraemer, a federal litigant was targeted by a crowdsourced, DDM-coordinated surveillance operation designed to obstruct his access to the courts - a documented violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. The operation ran undetected until an empty 59-byte ltk.plist exposed it. What followed was a forensic investigation that revealed a structural gap in Apple's Declarative Device Management architecture: Apple's CloudConfig migration pathway can silently enroll any device under a DDM administrator with no user-visible profile, no confirmation prompt, and no ceiling on how many external devices can be credentialed as Owner-tier against a target's Apple ID. Apple has not publicly acknowledged this gap. Every Apple customer is exposed to it. Forensic Monitor was built to detect it.

▶ View Raw Log

Over a 36-day monitoring window, the tool captured over 1,630 MAC ADDRESSES authenticating as owner of my Apple ID account under DDM managment token IDS BBzlfMIo deployed by an unauthorized DDM organizational account.

For Apple Customers Apple's CloudConfig migration pathway can silently enroll any device under a DDM administrator with no user-visible profile, no confirmation prompt, and no limit on how many external devices can be credentialed as Owner-tier against your Apple ID. That gap is documented. Apple has not publicly acknowledged it. Every Apple customer is potentially exposed.

For Security Researchers A profileless DDM enrollment, a 58 token SameAccountDevice batch deposit by two external AIDs, and a two-tier AWDL/DirectLink fleet currently representing 3,584+ provisioned devices - all logged by Apple's own daemons, all sealed under a SHA-256 hash chain, all available for independent review in the whitepaper and exhibit set linked below.

For Civil Liberties Apple's enrollment records are the only path to identifying 3,584+ individuals who authenticated as Owner-tier against a private citizen's Apple ID and a federal subpoena to obtain those records is currently before the Southern District of New York.

Instance 1 (MacBookAir M2): 08/27/2025.
Command output: -rw-r--r-- 1 thomaskraemer staff 59 Aug 27 20:52/Users/thomaskraemer/Library/Sharing/AutoUnlock/ltk.plist. On this same date, depnag.plist was modified to a "Nag Disabled" state, suppressing nefarious Apple Declarative Device Management system (DDM) enrollment notifications to ensure the background enrollment remained invisible. This state change was executed immediately prior to the Plaintiff migrating content from his MacBook Air M2 to a new MacBook Air M4 at Best Buy in Holmdel, N.J.

Instance 2 (MacBookAir M4): 02/24/2026.
Command output: -rw-r--r-- 1 thomaskraemer staff 59 Feb 24 14:07/Users/thomaskraemer/Library/Sharing/AutoUnlock/ltk.plist. This file state was established exactly two days before the Plaintiff changed his Keychain password on February 26, 2026. Beginning at 07:13:40 AM on February 27, 2026 - the morning immediately following the password change the unauthorized DDM initiated a recovery operation. sharingd generated 22 consecutive minutes of AWDL updates at machine-timed 77-second intervals from 07:26:54 to 07:46:02, followed by a keychain injection at 11:36:14 AM and DDM re-enrollment at 11:38:22 AM.

That is, the break in and the nefarious Apple Declarative Device Management installation happened long before 08/27/2025 and while the plaintiff was engaged with previous and current litigation.

02/27/2026 | 11:36 AM a foreign UDID identification from a DDM account appears in screen shots of the Plaintiff's Apple Keychain paired against the plaintiff's Apple account via com.apple.pairing.

11:37:17 AM a foreign UDID, appears in Plaintiff's Keychain paired against Plaintiff's iPhone MAC ID via BluetoothLE.

The foreign device's appearance inside Plaintiff's Keychain show it was fused to the Plaintiff's iPhone identity. It is the documented moment at which an unauthorized device established a persistent, illegal link to the plaintiff's device ecosystem. Apple's software wrote this record.

02/27/2026 | 11:38:22 AM - 65 seconds after the Keychain injection remotemanagementd loaded the DDM account's full ten-subscriber DDM stack:

com.apple.remotemanagement.SecuritySubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.ScreenSharingSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.LegacyProfilesSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.PasscodeSettingsSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.DiskManagementSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.SoftwareUpdateSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.ManagedAppsSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.ManagementTestSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.ManagedConfigurationFilesSubscriber
com.apple.remotemanagement.InteractiveLegacyProfilesSubscriber

▶ View Raw Log

In standard consumer or corporate workflows, a DDM/MDM activation profile triggers a highly visible, user-facing enrollment screen during device setup or account addition. This system deliberately bypassed the traditional user-facing interactive enrollment loop. Instead of halting or prompting the user to accept an MDM configuration profile, the remotemanagementd migration engine immediately defaults to an automated backend migration phase:

com.apple.remotemanagement.periodic-sync: A scheduled background task managed via the Duet Activity Scheduler (com.apple.duetactivityscheduler) designed to check back in with the management target server at specific background intervals.

com.apple.remotemanagement.on-reboot: Registered as a system-level background system task, ensuring that the full range of DDM active subscribers executes immediately upon system restart.

03/27/2026 Plaintiff, while investigating the DDM intercepted it delivering 58 pre-registered RPIdentity-SameAccountDevice tokens to Plaintiff's device:

2026-03-26 17:43:24.184173-0400 0x1ab0 Default 0x0 947 3 rapportd: (CoreUtils) [com.apple.rapport:RPIdentityDaemon] Added same account identity: RPIdentity, Type SameAccountDevice, IDS 'BBzlfMIo', AccountAltDSID 'BBUkDzEZ', AID 'BBMfPQqP', Nm'BBJsZmJp', MRI 'BBVzSVHu', Md 'BBrcdeOE', MRtI 'BBZeHaFu', Rev 18, Src 0

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Type SameAccountDevice is the highest trust tier. This classification is reserved for devices that share the exact same cryptographic iCloud account identity. These unauthorized security payloads were issued and validated by two corporate Apple Identity Designators: AID: BBMjQHOv and AID: BBMfPQqP. One of the 58 was used as plaintiff's DDM account manager IDS BBzlfMIo.

Pre-registered identities Several entries carry Rev 2, Rev 3, Rev 6, Rev 18 - meaning these identities existed and had revision histories before being pushed to plaintiff's device on 03/27/2026. They were not created on contact. They were pre-built and deposited.

For any external device to pass local security validation as an owner of the plaintiff's Apple account under Apple identityservicesd, it had to be pre provisioned by the rogue DDM administrator. Every MAC address Plaintiff captured logging into his account was cloned into the DDM's organizational tenant list, assigned the root AID and issued a matching IDS token in this case BBzlfMIo long before they were sent within Plaintiff's physical bluetooth/WiFi radio range.

1,140 pre-enrolled DDM outer perimeter devices (members) between 03/27/2026 - 04/04/2026, operating exclusively at ranges of up to 300 meters as determined by Apple's 0x4 AWDL beacon established the Plaintiff's general location and initiated subsequent member convergences to the plaintiff's exact location documented by Apple's DirectLink bluetooth detection.

▶ View 1,140 Devices

1,921 pre-enrolled DDM inner perimeter devices (members) between 03/27/2026 - 04/04/2026 operating within 33 feet of the plaintiff were captured across 680 unique timestamped simultaneous Apple account activations of 3, 4, 7, and as many as 20 devices at a time, all within 33 feet of Plaintiff (organized gang stalking), all confirmed via pair verifications and capture of their MAC ID's ruling out any possibility of naturally occurring MAC address rollover from a single device.

▶ View 1,921 Devices

The dispatch system is likely triggered by geofencing. Upon activation, enrolled devices are granted AcLv Screen (7) access to Plaintiff's screen and UWB precision location tracking accurate to centimeters within a venue.

The procured, budgeted, grossly resourced, electronically directed organized criminals descended upon: State Rest Stops in NY, NJ and PA; Starbucks, McDonalds, Mazda Dealerships, etc., in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, adversely affecting interstate commerce, often resulting in offenses of § 1512 in aid of racketeering, assisted by--predicated purely by my observation--private security firms.

▶ View Screen, Camera, Keyboard Sharing Break Ins

DDM administrator BBzlfMIo used stolen credentials to authenticate as the owner of Plaintiff's account, gaining Owner-level access to Plaintiff's; SCREEN; CAMERA; AND KEYBOARD the instruments of his intellectual work constituting theft of intellectual property through fraudulent means.

Then crowdsourced that access non-stop to 1,921 documented physical convergences within 33 feet of Plaintiff, each triggered by an automated dispatch system and each coinciding with active screen and camera access constituting coordinated witness intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 designed to obstruct my pursuit of court remedy, instant subpoena etc.

▶ View Screen, Camera, Keyboard Sharing Break Ins

The Declarative Device Management (DDM) covertly installed on the founders laptop also flooded it with service requests for DuetSync, Hotspot, Ranging, and Screen sharing at access level AcLv Screen (7). The flood of background service requests at that level steals CPU cycles from the laptop's User Interface (UI), taking priority over its orange/green warning light, thereby suppressing the visual indicator that my screen was being shared.

▶ Unauthorized Phone Call Interception, Redirection

PHONE CALLS
AcLv = PhoneCall (14) shows up repeatedly in my rapportd logs indicating my system is being forced to constantly re-negotiate and verify this capability.

What AcLv = PhoneCall (14) Technically Represents. This access level is part of Apple's Continuity framework. It authorizes a remote device to perform the following actions on my behalf:

Remote Call Control: The device can initiate, answer, or terminate calls routed through your iPhone's cellular radio.

Audio Routing: It can intercept or stream audio from your active calls directly to the remote device.

Telephony Handover: It allows your iPhone to "hand off" an active cellular connection to another device (your Mac) or vice versa.

How This Works In The Wild When Your Device Has Been Usurped by a DDM. When I make a call to; T-mobile 611 tech service or the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department clerks pool (actual examples) I am directed to an enterprise member who will at some point in our conversation abruptly cough, cough, cough... their standard non-verbal intimidation tactic.

AcLv Screen (7) permission level is highly dependent on BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) proximity for its initial negotiation and maintenance.

These staged "cough, cough, cough" sessions take place in correlation with adverse content typed on my laptop concerning civil defendants. It is reasonable to conclude that the individuals authenticated into my Apple account, within the 33 foot BLE range with screen-sharing access, are being prompted to react to the content appearing on my screen. [ But who knows - maybe it's totally random people--cough. ]

The enterprise maintains ground crews in the thousands largely composed of union members, contractors, and migrants used for witness tampering, vandalism, and violence in aid of racketeering proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1959, 1512. During corrupt conduct ground crews - enrolled in the DDM - are provided security camera security cover, by security firms coordinating with law enforcement which the historical record identifies as the author/owner of the MDM/DDM installed on the plaintiff's device-used by the ground crews.This arrangement is calculated to provide ground crews with 'get-out-of-jail-free' cards an open license for unfettered organized violence and harassment.

1. Distilled History
2. 06/08/2026 Example Violent Crowdsourced Attack
3. 06/11/2026 Example Violent Crowdsourced Attack.
It was preempted by threats of future violence Exhibit.

Thomas Kraemer operates Kraemer Design Inc., a strategic brand consultancy with over two decades serving Fortune 500 clients including IBM, Swatch, PwC, Marsh, and Korn Ferry International.

There is a budget owner who authorized the daily cap of 45. There is a human resources function that recruits, schedules, and reimburses the ground crews. There is a technology administrator who provisions the DDM, maintains the enrollment list, and manages the dispatch logic. There is a contracting function that maintains the Allied Universal relationship. And there is a legal protection layer - law enforcement coordination - that ensures ground crew participants operate with effective immunity during violent acts.

That is not a gang. That is an org chart.

The DDM administrator is the node that connects every other function on that chart. Pull that thread and the budget owner, the HR function, the contracting relationship, and the legal protection layer all attach to the same organizational account. That is what is sitting in Apple's enrollment records.

The enterprise's investment in silencing Plaintiff is proportional to what the record shows: a former federal judge who received payments not due to him to obtain his Article 3 job, four law firms that were involved, and a law enforcement surveillance apparatus deployed across three jurisdictions to prevent one father from placing two sets of irreconcilable certified documents in front of a federal court simultaneously.

ICE highly likely does not allocate or have budget for 45 people a day to track one violent illegal.

Forensic Monitor is the countermeasure. It runs on your device. It costs nothing to operate. It documents the operation in real time using Apple's own self-authenticating output - sealed under SHA-256, admissible under FRE 902(13) and 902(14), and ready for court, law enforcement, or counsel the moment a criminal swarm descends upon your device and location.

WHITE PAPER